In many share problems there is a priori given a natural set of possible divisions to solve the sharing problem. Cooperative games related to such share sets are introduced, which may be helpful in solving share problems. Relations between properties of share sets and properties of games are investigated. The average lexicographic value for share sets and for cooperative games is studied.
Introduction
Inspiration for this work came from the bankruptcy literature (Thomson [T] ) on bankruptcy problems and games. In their famous paper [AM] Aumann and Maschler considered the bankruptcy situations described in the Talmud, where the proposals for dividing the estate were for centuries a mystery. For understanding the Talmudic rule, the cooperative games related to share opportunity sets of the bankruptcy problems are helpful. Surprisingly the nucleolus of the cooperative bankruptcy games was the key for understanding the Talmudic examples.
Share opportunity sets can arise from many other practical situations, such as taxation problem or the airport landing fee problem, where cooperative games which may be helpful in giving a reasonable solution for the share problems can be also constructed. In this paper we make a systematic study of the interaction between share opportunity sets and related cooperative games. The average lexicographic vector for share sets and the average lexicographic value for balanced cooperative games [Ti] will also play a role. It turns out that the average lexicographic vector for bankruptcy share opportunity sets, coincides with the run to the bank rule discussed in O'Neill [O'N] .
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is devoted to preliminaries and notations. In section 3, share opportunity sets are introduced and examples of situations from which such share opportunity sets naturally arise are given. Furthermore continuity properties of the average lexicographic vector are studied. In section 4, we introduce operators which associate to share opportunity sets cooperative games. Special attention is paid to perfect opportunity sets which coincide with the core of related minimum right games. In section 5 we tackle the question which properties of share opportunity sets guarantee that the corresponding minimum right game is of a special type e.g. convex, big boss, simplex or dual simplex game. In section 6 we propose a method to extend classical concepts of solutions for TU-games to balanced partially defined games.
Preliminaries and notations
An n-person cooperative game ( [O] ) N, v with player set N = {1, 2, ..., n} is a map v : 2 N −→ R with v(∅) = 0, where 2 N is the collection of subsets of N . Let us denote with G N the set of all n-person cooperative games. Given the game N, v , its dual N, v * is the game defined by v
An n-person F-partially defined game (or simply partially defined game) N, v, F is a map v : F −→ R with v(∅) = 0. If v is a partially defined game, the partial core C F (v) is the bounded polyhedral set
is the core of v. Games with non empty core are called balanced games, while partially defined games with nonempty partial core are called partially balanced games. The dual core of N, v is the set C
The imputation set of N, v is the set
and the dual imputation set is
Note that
Given x ∈ R n , we denote with x −j the vector belonging to R n−1 obtained from x by deleting its j − th coordinate.
A game N, v is called:
• a simplex game if I(v) = C(v);
• a dual simplex game if I * (v) = C(v);
• a big boss game (BBG for short) with big boss 1 if:
• an exact game if the core C(v) of N, v is nonempty and for every S ⊆ N there exists x ∈ C(v) such that x(S) = v(S) (see [S] ).
Given a balanced game N, v , its exactification is the game N,v with v(S) = min x∈C(v) x(S) for each S ∈ 2 N . Given an ordering σ = (σ(1), σ(2), ..., σ(n)) in N and a compact subset A of R n , the Lexicographic maximum of A with respect to σ is the vector
, where Π(N ) denotes the set of all possible orderings in N . Given a balanced game N, v , we denote by AL(v) the vector AL(C(v)) (see Tijs in [Ti] ).
3 Share opportunity sets and share problems Let α ∈ R and H α = {x ∈ R n | x(N ) = α}. Let K n α the family of all compact subsets of H α and
Definition 1 We call each D ∈ K n share opportunity set (SOS) .
For each D ∈ K n α , the corresponding share problem is the problem of dividing α among 1, 2, ..., n, where D is the set of all possible allocations.
Definition 2 Let F ⊆ 2 N be such that ∅ ∈ F, {i} ∈ F for every i ∈ N and N ∈ F. We say that D ⊆ H α has a perfect structure if for all S ∈ F there exists β S ∈ R such that
Remark 1 If D has a perfect structure, then it belongs to K n and
where
Here we describe some examples of share opportunity sets related to wellknown problems and games .
the bankruptcy problem associated to (N, d, E) is the problem of finding a point in the share set
In this case D represents the set of all possible agreements among 1, 2, ...n.
Example 2 (Airport landing strip Problem) ( [LT] ) Let N = {1, 2, 3} and consider the airport problem such that the costs of parts of the landing strip are as follows:
and where the first player needs the part P Q of the landing strip, the second one needs the part P R of the landing strip and the third one needs the whole landing strip P S. Then the share set is
that represents the set of all possible agreements among 1, 2, 3 in order to divide the cost of the landing strip.
Example 3 Let N = {1, 2, 3}. D = {(2, 0, 1), (1, 2, 0), (0, 1, 2)} is a share set with α = 3. In this case also the smallest convex set containing D is a share set.
Example 4 Given a balanced game N, v , we can consider the share problem related to the core of N, v .
Example 5 Given a partially balanced game N, v, F we can consider the share problem related to C F (v).
A solution φ for share problems with share α is a rule that associates to
Here φ(D) represents the chosen share division of the share α. Let us consider the following solutions:
This is a natural solution if there is a fixed ordering σ of the players;
. This is a natural solution if we want to avoid discrimination among 1, 2, ..., n. AL(D) ∈ D whenever D is convex.
We endow K n with the Hausdorff topology ( [KT] ) in order to study continuity properties of L σ and AL on K n . Let A ∈ K n . We denote with arg max(A) the arg max{x σ(1) | x ∈ A}. The following lemma is an easy consequence of Berge's theorem (see [B] pag. 122).
Lemma 1 The multifunction arg max : K n ⇒ R n that associates to each A ∈ K n the set arg max(A) is upper semicontinuous.
In spite of its upper semicontinuity, arg max is not continuous on K n and L σ and AL are not continuous either, as it is shown in the folowing remark. On the other hand, we have continuity on P n : see Theorem 1.
Remark 2 L σ and AL are not continuous on K n w.r.t. the Hausdorff topology, as we illustrate in the following. Let σ = (1, 2, 3), A = co{(
To prove continuity of L σ and AL on P n , we use the following lemma:
Lemma 2 The multifunction arg max : P n ⇒ R n is lower semicontinuous on P n .
Proof The lower semicontinuity of arg max on P n follows directly from Theorem 4.3.5 pag 70 of [BGKKT] . It is enough to notice that linear functions belong to the class of "weakly analytic" functions, as defined in [BGKKT] . 2 Theorem 1 L σ and AL are continuous on P n .
Proof In lemma 1 and 2 we noticed that arg max is upper and lower semicontinuous in P n , so it is continuous. If A ∈ P n , then the set
belongs to P n−1 . By lemma 1 and 2 , the multifunction arg max σ(2) : P n−1 ⇒ R n−1 that associates to A σ(1) the arg max{x σ(2) | x ∈ arg max(A σ(1) )} is continuous on P n−1 . Repeating these arguments we prove continuity of L σ . As AL(A) is the average of all L σ (A), also AL is continuous on P n . 2 4 Operators from share opportunity sets to cooperative games
Let us consider the operators m, u :
Definition 3 We call the game N, m(D) the minimal right game related to D.
Definition 4 We call the game N, u(D) the utopia game related to D.
Remark 3 The game m(D) is superadditive and the game
Theorem 2 Suppose D ∈ K n . The following conditions are equivalent: a) D is the core of a partially defined game;
Proof It is obvious that c =⇒ a =⇒ b. Then it is sufficient to prove that b =⇒ c. Suppose D ∈ P n . Note that x ∈ D if and only if for every S ⊆ N , we have
Note that for each D ∈ K n α there is at least one E ∈ P n α with E ⊇ D. Proposition 1 The restriction of m to P n , i.e. m : P n → G N , is injective.
Proposition 2 m is continuous on K n .
Proof We must prove that
H → means convergence with respect to the Hausdorff topology. This is a consequence of Berge's maximum theorem (see [B] , pag 122).
2
Remark 6 Remark 5 and propositions 1 and 2 hold also for the operator u.
Remark 7 The function pc : K n −→ P n that associates to each D ∈ K 
) = AL(m(D)).
K n is a convex cone with respect to the Minkowski sum and the scalar product. On K n are also defined intersection, union and inclusion. We are interested in the behavior of m and u with respect to these operations. min x∈D x i < 0.
Then we have that
which implies that the game is not monotonic. 2
Simplex and dual simplex games
Let us set
• We say that property
Theorem 5 Proof We must prove that
Consider then a coalition S N and let us take
Suppose now that I (m(D)) = C (m(D)) . By definition, a i belongs to I(m(D)) and then also to C(m(D)). Then a i ∈ D by theorem 5, and so property P i (D) holds for all i ∈ N . 2 The following theorem can be proved using arguments similar to the ones of the previous theorem. 
Big boss games
Let us consider now a characterization of big boss games. Let us consider the
, and then they proved the following theorem. For share opportunity sets the following theorem holds. 
As
Suppose now x ∈ C(m(D)). If i = 1, then by (3) we have x i ≥ m(D)({i}) = 0, and as m(D)(N \{i}) ≤ Σ j =i x j , we have
. 2 For share opportunity sets and related big boss games we have the following characterization. 
Convex games
Let σ = (σ(1), ..., σ(n)) be an ordering in N and letσ = (σ(n), σ(n − 1), ..., σ(1)) be the reverse ordering of σ. Given D ∈ K n , we define r σ (D) = (r σ (1) , ..., r σ(n) ) by
Remark 10 Note that
Choose an ordering σ of the form (S, T S, i, N (T ∪ {i})) , which means that players in S enter first, then the players in T \ S followed by player i. Then r σ (D) = x ∈ D and min    j∈T ∪{i}
and if we choose an ordering σ of the form (S, {i}, T S 
2 The converse doesn't hold as we can see in the following example.
Theorem 12 Let D ∈ P n be such that m(D) is a convex game. Then R σ (D) holds for all σ ∈ Π (N ).
Proof As in this case
Corollary 1 Suppose that D ∈ P n . Then m(D) is convex if and only if for all σ ∈ Π (N ), R σ (D) holds.
Partially defined games
Consider a partially balanced game N, v, F . The partial core C F (v) of this partially balanced game is a set with a perfect structure and it is possible to define the minimum right game associated to C F (v) as m(C F (v)). Hence, if γ is a solution defined for cooperative games, we can extend this solution to partially balanced games as follows. If N, v, F is a partially balanced game, then γ( N, v, F ) = γ(m(C F (v))). In particular, if we consider the definition of L σ and AL given by Tijs in [Ti] , we can extend such definitions to partially balanced games. In section 3 we gave the definition of AL and L σ also for subsets of R n and we proved their continuity with respect to the Hausdorff topology on P n . Like any partially balanced game N, v, F , C F (v) is a set with a perfect structure, then AL and L σ are continuous. More precisely, the following theorems hold. 
Concluding remarks
Each share opportunity set gives rise to a minimum right game and a utopia game. For the subclass of perfect share opportunity sets (i.e. opportunity sets with a perfect structure) the relation between share opportunity sets and the corresponding games is a continuous relation and also the lattice structures on share opportunity sets and on games fit nicely.
For bankruptcy games the minimum right games are convex games and the utopia games are concave games. Further the average lexicographic value coincides with with run to the bank rule and the Shapley value.
For airport games, the corresponding games are concave and convex respectively. Further the average lexicographic value coincides with the Shapley value of the airport game.
